Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas

Autor:	Fernando P. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, Francisco C. Santos, António Góis
Přispěvatelé:	Universidade do Minho
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	0301 basic medicine Punishment (psychology) Ciências Biológicas [Ciências Naturais] lcsh:Medicine 02 engineering and technology Collective action Article 03 medical and health sciences Phénomènes atmosphériques 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics Sanctions lcsh:Science Ciências Naturais::Ciências Biológicas Multidisciplinary Science & Technology Public economics Computational science lcsh:R Tragedy of the commons Nonlinear phenomena Public good Risk perception 030104 developmental biology Incentive Action (philosophy) 13. Climate action 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing lcsh:Q
Zdroj:	Scientific Reports, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2019) Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) instacron:RCAAP Scientific Reports Scientific reports, 9 (1
ISSN:	2045-2322
DOI:	10.1038/s41598-019-52524-8
Popis:	Mitigating climate change effects involves strategic decisions by individuals that may choose to limit their emissions at a cost. Everyone shares the ensuing benefits and thereby individuals can free ride on the effort of others, which may lead to the tragedy of the commons. For this reason, climate action can be conveniently formulated in terms of Public Goods Dilemmas often assuming that a minimum collective effort is required to ensure any benefit, and that decision-making may be contingent on the risk associated with future losses. Here we investigate the impact of reward and punishment in this type of collective endeavors — coined as collective-risk dilemmas — by means of a dynamic, evolutionary approach. We show that rewards (positive incentives) are essential to initiate cooperation, mostly when the perception of risk is low. On the other hand, we find that sanctions (negative incentives) are instrumental to maintain cooperation. Altogether, our results are gratifying, given the a-priori limitations of effectively implementing sanctions in international agreements. Finally, we show that whenever collective action is most challenging to succeed, the best results are obtained when both rewards and sanctions are synergistically combined into a single policy. SCOPUS: ar.j info:eu-repo/semantics/published
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c818ae9aad96db407fff0ac5ef9a7a05 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1038/s41598-019-52524-8 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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