| Abstrakt: |
Student cheating is a growing concern in all aspects of higher education, particularly in technical programs such as information systems. Technology is also enabling student cheating. This paper utilizes existing literature and various behavioral theories, including incentive theory, the theory of planned behavior, social reciprocity theory, expected utility theory, and deterrence theory to develop a model of cheating incentive in students. The model was tested using a survey of 245 undergraduate students in a decision sciences class at a large US land-grant university, with the results showing that the incentive to cheat is predicted by the student's satisfaction with the assessment process and observed cheating by peers. Perceived evaluation congruence (the perception of the student that the exam measures knowledge of the course material) was, in turn, found to be a precursor of satisfaction. Many institutions focus on increasing the risk of being caught and punished, but focusing on the student's satisfaction with the assessment process as a way of reducing the incentive to cheat is also key. This may begin a virtuous cycle, where greater congruence between the class material and the assessment mechanism leads to greater satisfaction with the assessment, which leads to a reduction in the incentive to cheat. This, in turn, leads to more valid testing data for the instructor, which leads to even greater congruence and satisfaction. The reduction in individual cheating will lead to a reduction in observed cheating, lowering the incentive to cheat even further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
