The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Autor: Higashijima, Masaaki
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2022
Předmět:
election
autocracy
dictatorship
electoral fraud
electoral system
electoral reform
electoral manipulation
economic policy
political business cycles
fiscal policy
coup
protest
opposition
distributive politics
Central Asia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
developing country
democratization
regime change
natural resource
oil
state capacity
dominant party
Nursultan Nazarbaev
Askar Akaev
bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government
bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPH Political structure & processes::JPHF Elections & referenda
bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPH Political structure & processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy
bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HB History::HBJ Regional & national history::HBJF Asian history
Druh dokumentu: book
DOI: 10.3998/mpub.11978139
Popis: Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition’s stunning election victories. The book’s theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Databáze: OAPEN Library
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