| Popis: |
The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. More specifically, I defend a new interpretation of the child’s right to an open future that pays special attention to the challenges of parenting in a morally imperfect world. |
