| Popis: |
In this thesis, I argue that the epistemology of memory is a useful but neglected explanatory resource in the philosophical treatment of problems associated with introspection. Not only is a far-reaching convergence in our thinking about introspective failure and memory failure, but by focusing on the epistemology of memory it is possible to explain much of what is thought special about knowledge of our own minds. To demonstrate, I arrange the purportedly distinctive features of self-knowledge into a list of desiderata that can be used to measure the success of a theory. Once the desiderata are clear, it can be shown how the epistemology of memory plays an important role in explaining how a prominent approach of self-knowledge might be successful, and how memory can explain or enhance explanations of some of the main desiderata. To demonstrate the extent to which the memory can be explanatorily useful in this domain, I construct a test theory of self-knowledge around a standard case of recollection and show that it fares well against most if not all desiderata. |
