| Popis: |
Much research has focused on the official government policies of India and Pakistan towards Kashmir. Many choose to focus on the political process, prospects for a peaceful resolution, diplomatic hurdles, or the impact that the stalemate has on the economies of the parties involved. Surprisingly little attention in the West has been paid to several notable Pakistani non-state actors who are increasingly operating on their own and who have the potential to greatly inhibit, if not derail, the peace process between India and Pakistan. This research project will focus on Dawood Ibrahim and D-Company for a variety of reasons. For one, D-Company is the largest organised criminal syndicate in Asia. Its network spans the globe and has operations in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and South Africa, amongst others. Secondly, D-Company controls much of the smuggling activity at key ports such as Mumbai, Karachi, and Dubai. Further, D-Company is unique in that it is one of the only criminal syndicates to only include members from a particular religious background (Islam), to have its most senior leadership based overseas (primarily in Karachi), to consist of members ready and willing to attack their own country (India), and to have blurred the line between an organised criminal group and a terrorist network. In-addition to narcotics and weapons trafficking, extortion, racketeering, money laundering and contract killings, D-Company has permitted Al-Qaeda and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to use its smuggling routes. The decision was made to focus on the activites of LeT over other Kashmir-centred militant groups because LeT is often referred to as the largest group operating within Indian territory and has the stongest links with D-Company, a relationship facilitated and nurtured by the ISI. This research challenges the conventional wisdom that TTP and Al-Qaeda are Pakistan's most serious security challenges. LeT has benefitted from decades of state patronage and military training, enjoys strong relationships with criminal syndicates and other terrorist groups (Pakistani and otherwise) and, critically, enjoys a favourable perception amongst everyday Pakistanis due to its carefully crafted image of being on the frontline against a hostile India. Neither Al-Qaeda nor the TTP have the level of domestic sympathy of LeT. This research is highly relevant to policymaking in that it attempts to focus attention on a dynamic of the Kashmir impasse that receives an inadequate amount of attention. Although the role of regular military forces are not to be discounted, many of the non-state actors in 1HK, such as LeT, are also very powerful but are not confined by the same restraints as state forces, thus allowing them engage in more violent actions without as much fear of reprisal. LeT is unlikely to be affected by economic sanctions or arms embargoes and neither is D-Company. In order for lawmakers, security personnel, and other Kashmir watchers to develop a sound, comprehensive policy, this underworld relationship and its potential to undermine political initiatives must be fully appreciated. |
