| Popis: |
In late January 2000, the EU14 initiated a protest co-ordinated by the Portuguese EU Presidency against the coalition between Wolfgang Schüssel’s ÖVP and Jörg Haider’s right-wing extremist/populist FPÖ, accused of violating EU fundamental values expressed in Article 6(1) TEU. When the government took office on 4 February diplomatic ‘sanctions’ were launched. During spring, the EU14’s wider interpretations of the sanctions, clumsy handling of Austrian countermeasures and deficient strategy on dismantling the protest contributed to crisis escalation. The solution was the appointment of so-called ‘wise men’ to evaluate the political nature of the FPÖ and the effects of the EU14’s ‘diplomatic whipping’ on government policies. Shortly after the Wise Men Report was published the EU14 lifted the ‘sanctions’ unconditionally, but insistent question marks remained. At the informal European Council meeting in Biarritz 13-14 October, the EU14 and the Austrian government agreed on amendments to the trigger mechanisms for the ‘sanctions article’, Article 7 TEU, incorporated in the Nice Treaty from December 2000. This study argues that the EU14’s interests and preferences concerning Article 6(1) TEU, coupled with a consensus-reflex and imagined and ‘real’ time pressure manifested in groupthink and ‘tele groupthink’, a concept including telephone diplomacy, affected the norm during its ‘journey’ through five stages: warning, implementation, crisis escalation, crisis de-escalation, and consequences. A central claim is that both self-interested behaviour and ideational/normative motives guided the EU14, but in a ‘more or less’ way. Mutually complementary arguments from both the rationalist and constructivist paradigms prove compelling in investigating this particularly complex and multi-faceted case. This study concludes that the EU14-Austria crisis resulted not in a rupture in the integration process, but in consolidation of EU fundamental values expressed in Article 6(1) TEU. Thanks to mixed experiences with the EU14’s ‘diplomatic whipping’ of the FPÖ-ÖVP government, the Union took another step towards tighter monitoring of Member States’ compliance with its constituent values. This step was reflected in amendments to Article 7 TEU. The EU14-Austria crisis, as here presented, illustrates the claim that Union-wide crises can have a positive effect on its normative foundation. |
