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Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the share of independent boardmembers, controlling for different forms of independence, and agency costs correlate within Swedish firms listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm list for large firms. The goal is to extend the understanding of board independence in relation to agency costs while adding empirical insight into the Swedish Code requirements on the board of directors. Theoretical Perspective: With a theoretical anchor in agent theory, this study presents the two conflicts assumed to exist between the agent and the principals within the firms. The first conflict is between agent and principal, and the second is between principal and principal. The agency perspective is used to explain how agency costs arise, within which conflict they arise, and how board members' independence should mitigate these. Method: This study applied a positivistic, deductive research approach using a quantitative strategy. Data was collected from annual reports and the databases Orbis, Holdings, and Retriever Business. Proxies were used for measuring agency costs. The statistical analysis ofthe data consisted of Pearson correlation, linear regressions, and binary logistic regressions. Conclusion: No unambiguous negative correlation could be confirmed between independent board members and agency costs when examined separately. A tradeoff in board members'independence and total agency costs can be confirmed. This implies that when coexisting board members’ different independence works in opposing directions for reducing the residual loss tied both to the agent-principal conflict and the principal-principal conflict |
