Managerial Empire Building and Discretionary R&D decision
| Autor: | Yi-Ting Chen, 陳怡婷 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 107 Previous literature found that the managerial motivation of the empire building is a kind of agency problem. Managers may act on the basis of self-interest, which is not conducive to the benefits of the company or stakeholders. So, this paper use a sample of U.S. software firms from 2003 to 2017 to investigate the impact that managerial empire building has on discretionary R&D decision. I find that when managers with high incentives to build empire will increase R&D expense expenditure and R&D capitalization expenditure to achieve their self-interested activities. Furthermore, in additional tests, I change the dependent variable to total R&D expenditure to test the impact of managerial empire building. The empirical results show that when the managers with high incentives to build managerial empire, the situation of excessive investment in total R&D expenditure will be more serious than the underinvestment. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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