Consequences of Poor Monitoring for Compensation Committee Members
| Autor: | LEE,YI-HSUAN, 李宜璇 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 106 The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the poor monitoring by the compensation committee members will affect their turnover, and whether it will affect the reputation of the compensation committee members. By using the data, “the company of net loss with increasing board payment”, disclosed by Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange as the evidence for poor monitoring of compensation committees, the empirical results show that companies with poor monitoring compensation committees are more likely to change their committee members. Furthermore, this study also finds that compensation committee members who serve on the companies with poor compensation system are more likely to lose their directorships of other companies. Taken together, the results of this study indicate that inefficient monitoring harms the reputation of the committee members. It is necessary for the regulators to disclose corporate governance information for stakeholders to make decisions. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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