The Association between Executive Compensation and Audit Fees
| Autor: | NAKAYAMA,ERIKO, 中山惠利子 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 105 There will be agency problem in those enterprise separated ownership and authority results from the aims management and shareholders differed. To solve the agency problem, not only set up effective supervision system, but also design positive management compensation could solve it. However, this study considered that a risk of an enterprise could be observed from management compensation. For example, increasing the gap between compensation levels will encourage staff which game theory proposed (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). But Eriksson (1999) found that the higher the business risks were, the more possible the company would use compensation gap to encourage their staff. In practice, there are often to see equity option ingredients such as share options in management compensation of the listed and OTC companies. While equity compensation value is always associated with accounting earnings, management are more motivated to do earning management for more wealth. An auditor should audit financial reports if there were any misstatements to make reasonable assurances, and take audit fees. Audit fees include not only cost but also audit risk premium. Therefore, this study tried to measure the compensation risk from the audit fees. The empirical results indicated that when the larger gaps between compensation level were, the higher audit fees were. However, audit fees wouldn’t affect by the proportion of higher management’s equity compensation. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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