A Study on the Leniency Policy to Fight Cartel
| Autor: | WU,TING-YI, 吳亭儀 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 105 Cartels consist of more than one firm, and engage in price-fixing, bid-rigging, allocation of resources, and market shares in the market. Cartels have had a harmful impact on consumer welfare, public interest, and national economy. Through organising a cartel, the members achieve great profits. The common goal of profit maximisation requires the cartel members to cooperate. It is obvious that, cartels have to be detected and punished by competition authorities. However, the difficult problem is how to discover secret cartels. Therefore, the competition authorities published a policy which is called “Leniency Policy” to discover more and more secret cartels. As the cartel members were originally competitors, don’t have enough trust in each other. Leniency Policy uses the heavy penalties of coercion and exempt from penalty to attract members to inform the facts and evidence of cartel. Thus, the competition authorities can investigate and deal with cartel quickly, and restore the normal order of the market order. Today, more than 50 countries have incorporated Leniency Policy into competition law and have become a good way to counter cartels. Taiwan formally implement Leniency Policy in 2012, there was still a need for continuous research and experience. Therefore, this paper attempts to introduce and analyze the cartel and Leniency Policy of the United States, European Union, China and Taiwan, and then discuss the representative cases of these countries in recent years. Finally put forward suggestions to improve Taiwan's Leniency Policy and cartel regulations. Expecting to make insignificant contributions for the development of competition law in Taiwan. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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