Analytical study of the issues about the participative budgeting under asymmetric information
| Autor: | Chen-Shih Chia, 陳世佳 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 102 The purpose of this research is to discuss participative budgeting under asymmetric information. Participative budget is a budgeting progression in which those who are impacted by departmental budgets are actively involved in the budget formation process and it is normally conducted with a bottom-up approach. Although it incurs more agency costs than a top-down budgeting approach, a bottom-up budgeting approach provides lower-level employees with more opportunities to participate in the process of budgeting. With cost advantages, low-cost departments tend to imitate high-cost departments for additional payoffs. Therefore, executives should set up proper mechanisms in order to prevent such behaviors. To further investigate if departments’ behaviors would affect each other under participative budgeting, this study assumed that enterprises need to dismiss one of the two departments. The result showed that when departments are under the pressure of being terminated, they tend to change their behaviors accordingly. Not only do the low-cost departments have the motivation to duplicate the policies of high-cost departments, but also the high-cost departments have the motivation to imitate the policies of low-cost departments to avoid the chance of being dismissed. In addition, the study analyzed the effects to both low and high cost departments when the time of observation and the remaining time to serve the enterprise varies. The result showed that when we deal with long-term production contracts, adopting independent cost strategy can benefit the enterprises . |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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