Corporate Governance and Compensation of Top Management
| Autor: | Yang, Chingyi, 楊靜宜 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 101 In a decade year, public companies have suffered from operating loss due to financial crisis and economic recession. However, some executives of those companies have been overpaid compensation regardless of shareholders’ sufferings. To hinder a growing agency cost, authorities acclaim to mitigate executives’ self-interests with mechanism of corporate governance. This study examines the cause-effect relationship between corporate governance and overpaid executives’ compensation from perspectives of board structure, ownership structure and disclosure transparency, respectively. After investigating into 2,016 public companies during the period from 2005 to 2010, the study find that the busier the independent directors and/or the higher institutional shareholdings, the higher likelihood executives are overpaid. Controlling for industry characteristics, the study finds that the shareholdings of directors and supervisors is a significant factor resulting in overpaid executive compensation in the traditional manufacturing, chemical and biotech, and electronic industries. For public companies in the chemical and biotech and electronic industries, duality is another significant factor contributing to overpaid executive compensation. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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