Privacy Enhancement Mechanisms for Electronic Payment Protocols
| Autor: | Yu-Kuang Liang, 梁宇光 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 101 With the development of electronic commerce, an increasing number of users are willing to adopt electronic payment in order to experience fast and convenient online transactions. As online payment confidentiality has met with universal acceptance, users are expectant of greater protection for their transactions in the form of transaction privacy protection (anonymity), user and vendor right protection (fairness), etc. In general, electronic payment fairness is achieved by adopting fair exchange mechanisms, which involve a trusted third party. On the other hand, different mechanisms have to be designed according to the amount of payment for user anonymity. For micropayments, efficient hash functions are commonly adopted and public key operations are avoided so that fast and efficient transactions are achieved. Originally, micropayments were designed to achieve efficiency during payments that occur frequently. Most of them adopt an offline broker (bank) and a postpaid method. The advantages of such schemes are that the user can make payments to different vendors with a single withdrawal and enjoy the benefit of delayed payment. However, many successive studies sacrifice these advantages in order to include anonymity in micropayment. In some schemes, users have to communicate with the broker repeatedly if they intend to make payments to different vendors. In the other schemes, the postpaid method, which is favorable for the user, is changed to a prepaid one. In order to avoid possible losses to the bank, macropayments usually adopt online electronic cash (e-cash) for user anonymity and doublespending checking. However, the anonymity of a user is not completely protected in current schemes. The shopping behavior of a user (such as what products the user has purchased) could still be revealed during transactions. Moreover, a complete definition and formal security proof of transaction security have not been proposed. In this dissertation, we propose privacy enhancement mechanisms for current electronic payment protocols. We design an efficient one-time anonymous certificate scheme for micropayment to achieve user anonymity and to ensure that the advantages of original micropayment mechanisms are not sacrificed. That is, we propose an anonymous fair offline postpaid micropayment scheme. In order to improve user privacy, which is a problem in the current schemes due to their incompleteness of product privacy, we design an anonymous fair transaction scheme based on e-cash to achieve complete user anonymity during macropayments. Although guarantee of security in this research field is usually provided by security analyses instead of complete theoretical proofs, this dissertation provides complete security definitions and formal theoretical proofs of the anonymous fair electronic payment protocols to make the security of the proposed schemes more convincing. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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