Institutional Investor, Board Structure, Compensation and Related Party Transactions
| Autor: | Yu-Hao Hong, 洪鈺浩 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 100 In recent years, there are many companies having a improper usage of related party transactions, which are regarded as the way transferring benefits and turning to the related party so that hollow out of the company's assets. This research with the perspective about institutional investors, board structure and compensation contracts is discussed to conclude the influence on related party transaction and to analyze the performance of corporations that use related party transactions with high degree whether is significantly inferior to those applied or not. The main research objects are Taiwanese listed companies involved in Related Party Transaction during 2006 to 2010. The major conclusions of this research are summarized as follow: 1. When the active institutional investors’ holdings become more will have supervisory effects on related party transactions. On the other hand, the more stocks that passive institutional investors hold which result in the increase of related party transactions. 2. When the size of the board is larger, the worse capability of supervising is, which lead to the increase of related party transactions. 3. Senior manager and directors’ compensation that possessing supervisory capability to the related party transactions. 4. The performance of corporations using Related Party Transactions with highly degree is significantly inferior to those applied with low degree. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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