Autor:	Kuan-Hsien Ho, 何冠嫻
Rok vydání:	2009
Druh dokumentu:	學位論文 ; thesis
Popis:	97 This study examines whether diversified firms have principal-agent problem. In this paper, we illustrate a different approach to test these issues for U.S. sample during the period of 2002-2007. We select two measures to examine agency implication of diversification: CEO turnover and CEO compensation. We find that: CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance for diversified firms, and pay-performance sensitivity is weaker for diversified firms. Additionally, our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate performance. Taken together, our results support the argument that diversified firms are characterized by severe agency conflicts.
Databáze:	Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations
Externí odkaz:	http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57828587390735046387 Zobrazit plný text záznamu