激勵性稽核政策之分析
| Autor: | Li-ju Hsu, 徐麗如 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2008 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 96 The franchise organization use relatively low cost to enter the market, that they can achieve the economy of scale. Although time and cost restricted, the franchisers（principal）unable entirely to supervise the franchisees（agent）. Information asymmetry has been a popular phenomenon in the variety of agency structures, and it result in the agent problem. We know that the best audit policy can relieve problem resulted from information asymmetry. This study intends to insight into how previous audit experience influences the principal’s audit decision. The principal tends to reduce the probability of auditing agent if the latter has a “good” audit record. Under the two-period audit setting and analyzing, the conclusion of this study shows that it’s not necessary for the principal to use a conditional audit in two-period audit scenario. In other words, the optimal audit policy for the second period doesn’t necessarily depend on the audit result in the first period. The franchisers have no need to adjust audit probability according to audit result in the first period, when he received declaration of low profit. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
| Externí odkaz: |
|