Channel Selection and Welfare Analysis in Retail Market under Different Channel Power
| Autor: | Pei-Li Tseng, 曾貝莉 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2007 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 95 A three-stage three-person non-cooperative game is designed in the thesis to model two manufacturers’ and one common retailer’s channel arrangement for product distribution. Goods are assumed to have linear demands with vertical strategic substitutability which consider the effects of both product differentiation and store differentiation. Then we analyze the channel selection and welfare in the retail market under the three channel power, Manufacturer-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Retailer-Stackelberg with slotting allowance. Chapter 2 studies the strategic selection of manufacturers’ direct selling and retailer’s private brand in retail market under Manufacturer-Stackelberg. Two manufacturers, besides dealing channel, decide whether to sell directly, and one retailer decides whether to adopt a private brand. Then manufacturers set their wholesale prices for dealing channel’s goods. In the last stage, all manufacturers/retailer compete in price margins. Our results show that direct selling and private brand are dominant strategies for manufacturers and retailer, respectively. Both consumer surplus and social welfare are the highest in equilibrium. Good in dealing channel has the lowest margin and the highest retail price among all sales channels. When products are less differentiated, manufacturers’ profits are lower. When stores are less differentiated, retailer’s profits are lower. Chapter 3 studies the strategic selection of manufacturers’ direct selling and retailer’s private brand in retail market under Retailer-Stackelberg. In the first stage, each manufacturer, besides selling its product the retailer (the dealing channel), has to decide whether to sell it through a direct selling channel. The retailer, besides selling manufacturers’ products, has to decide whether to also sell its private brand product through a private brand channel. Each manufacturer and the retailer then have to determine their retail margins of all channels’ products; finally, the two manufacturers compete on wholesale price for the dealing channel’s product. Results show direct selling and private brand are dominant strategies for manufacturers and the retailer, respectively. Consumer surplus and social welfare are highest in the equilibrium because diversification of products and stores increases consumers’ willingness to pay. Chapter 4 compares the welfare of Retailer-Stackelberg (RS) with slotting allowance with manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) under the multiple channels of dealing, direct selling and private brand. Our results show that under RS, manufacturer/retailer’s profit decrease and consumer/social welfare increase with product substitutability or store substitutability. Finally, retail price is the lowest and consumer/social welfare are the highest under RS with slotting allowance. Retail price is the highest and consumer/social welfare are the lowest under MS. The member’s profit is higher with channel power than without it. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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