THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTION: A DEFENSE OF PHENOMENALIM AGAINST INTENTIONALISM
| Autor: | Linus Ta-Lun Huang, 黃大倫 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2006 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 94 Brentano’s Thesis, “Intentionality as the mark of the mental”, has enjoyed resurgence in philosophy of mind. This thesis posits intentionality as the fundamental feature of mental phenomena, and as a result, all mental states are intentional states. Intentionalism, following this tradition, is a view according to which (a) intentional contents are fundamental to the mental realm and (b) phenomenal character of a state can reduce to its intentional content. As I shall argue, both theses are false, because consciousness is the fundamental feature of the mental realm, and intentionality supervenes on consciousness and sensory-motor structures. In this thesis, I will first review the debates of intentionalism and phenomenalism, arguing that no arguments have successfully established either of them. Second, I will present my own argument for phenomenalism, that emotion feelings are phenomenal states that have no intentional contents. Third, I will argue that consciousness is necessary but not sufficient for intentionality. Finally, I will present a sketch of a phenomenalist theory of consciousness and intentionality: intentionality supervenes on consciousness and sensory-motor structures. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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