On the decision of risky investment with agency problem
| Autor: | Kong-feng Horng, 洪國峰 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2006 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 94 This paper will investigate the problem that a risk aversive manager invariably invest in riskless projects when making decisions. But the principle will not willing to see it due to preferring the project with positive net present value to riskless projects. To solve this equity-agent problem, principle will design a contract to induce manager to choose the best project, and hence diminish the agency problem. Here we will take the study of Lambert (1986) as a base, and separate the agency problem into two parts. By using the game theory analysis, we are going to discuss the problem that how the principle designs the contract, and how the manager makes the decision when facing the contract. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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