The Research of the Difference of Brand Preference and Software Protection Strategy
| Autor: | Fang-Ju Chou, 周芳如 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2001 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 89 Because of none of the related research about the difference of brand preference and software protection strategy in Taiwan, I expect to find the relationship between the difference of brand preference and software protection strategy. As a result, the difference of brand preference will influence the size of network externality, and then influence software firms’ protection strategy. First, I discuss two firms which have different brand preference use three different kinds of strategies（when firms do not protect their software、when firms protect their software、when one firm protects and another firm does not protect）in a price-setting duopoly software industry. Then I use simulation approach to analysis the effect of the software difference of brand preference. It include three parts： First, I find the effect of the difference of brand preference on boundary of the network externality under the certain strategy. In result, the bigger of the difference of brand preference, the smaller of the scope of network externality under the strong network externality, then the firms could not fall their software prices. The bigger of the difference of brand preference, the smaller of the scope of network externality under the weak network externality, then the firms could not raise their software prices. Second, I discuss the effect of the difference of brand preference on software protection strategy under weak network externality. As a result, under the weak network effect, as long as two firms’ brand preference are not equal, the smaller of the difference of brand preference, the stronger of the network effect, then the higher of the possibility firms to make profits from their strategies. And the smaller the difference of brand preference, the stronger of the network externality, and then two firms could not use the same strategies. Final, I discuss the effect of the difference of brand preference on software protection strategy under strong network externality. In result, two firms do not protect their software is the best strategy portfolio under the strong network effect. The smaller of the difference of brand preference, the higher of the possibility two firms use the strategy. As long as the difference of two firms’ brand preference is very small, two firms could make profits from their different strategies. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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