Corruption, environmental regulation and market entry

Autor: Biswas, Amit K., Thum, Marcel
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2017
Předmět:
Druh dokumentu: Článek
ISSN: 1355-770X
1469-4395
DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X16000218
Popis: The authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfaremaximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government.
Databáze: Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations