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Since 2001, a broad consensus has formed amongst scholars regarding the occurrence of a major shift in US grand strategy during the early years of the twenty-first century. While disagreement exists regarding the likely consequences of this shift, most scholars accept that, during the early years of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed a marked shift in US grand strategy from multilateralism to unilateralism. This thesis challenges such arguments, and contends that US grand strategy did not radically change during the early years of the twenty-first century, despite the election of George W. Bush and the impact of 9/11. Instead, through highlighting the constraining and enabling role played by American strategic culture, this thesis argues that throughout the period from 1997-2003 administration officials persistently deployed rhetoric regarding US grand strategy that was characterised by the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism. The thesis proceeds in three parts. The first chapter of this thesis presents both a critique and a reconceptualisation of strategic culture theory. Chapter one defines strategic culture as an intersubjective system of symbols and norms that constrains and enables political practices relating to the construction of grand strategy. Strategic culture constitutes the political practices of security policy makers as meaningful and, in doing so, shapes the realm of the politically possible with regard to the construction of security policy. The constraining influence of strategic culture results in the emergence of patterns in the rhetorical practices of security policy makers. This account of strategic culture theory provides the theoretical foundation upon which the remainder of the thesis is built. The purpose of chapters two and three is to map American strategic culture. Chapter two compares three prominent narratives of US security policy history, and concludes that it is the unilateralist/multilateralist narrative that it is the most compelling of the three. Chapter three goes on to construct a map of US strategic culture that emphasises the central role played by the logics of unilateralism and multilateralism. In order to do so, this chapter identifies and distinguishes unilateralist and multilateralist norms relating to, firstly, the identity of the United States, secondly, the meaning of security, and thirdly, the relative utility of security policy instruments. Furthermore, this chapter locates these norms relative to one another and, in doing so, draws out the internal logic of unilateralism and multilateralism. Chapters four and five apply this map of US strategic culture to an examination of the grand strategies of the Clinton and Bush administrations. More specifically, these chapters conduct an analysis of the rhetoric and practices of these administrations. It is within the administrations rhetoric and practices that the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism is evident. In each of these two chapters this tension is elucidated through the analysis of the rhetorical practices of administration officials as they relate to US identity, the meaning of security and the utility of military force. The analysis of US grand strategy carried out in this thesis highlights the persistent tension within the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush between the logics of unilateralism and multilateralism. In doing so, this thesis challenges the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical findings of much of the existing literature on US grand strategy. Through focusing on the role of strategic culture in the enabling and constraining of political action with respect to security policy, this thesis challenges accounts of grand strategy that highlight the causal power of either the constraints imposed by the external security environment or the role of specific policy makers in the shaping of US security policy. Instead, this thesis demonstrates that strategic culture influences both representations regarding the external security environment and the realm of political possibility in which policy makers must act. Empirically, this thesis challenges the argument that US grand strategy has shifted radically in the early years of the twenty-first century, and suggests instead that we are likely to continue to witness an American grand strategy that is shaped by the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism within US strategic culture. |
