| Popis: |
British propaganda, delivered in the United States against immediate self-government for India in 1942, was efficiently and effectively organised. British propaganda was not adventitious. It was deliberate. The chief protagonists were Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill's success in retaining control of government in India depended on convincing the President that there was no viable alternative. This the Prime Minister did in two ways. Firstly, his propaganda organization targetted pro-British groups in America with access to Roosevelt. Secondly, it discredited Indian nationalist leadership. Churchill's success also depended on Sir Stafford Cripps' loyalty to Whitehall and to the Government of India after his Mission in March 1942 failed to reach agreement with the Indian leaders. Cripps tailored his account of the breakdown of negotiations to fit the British propaganda line. Convincing American public opinion and, through it the President, that colonial government should remain in British hands, also depended on the right mix of censorship and press freedom in India. Britain's need to mount a propaganda campaign in the United States indicated its dual agenda: its war-related determination to maintain and increase American aid, and its longer term aim to retain control of its empire. Despite strong American support for isolationism, given legal status in the 1930s Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt was Britain's supportive friend and its ally. Britain, nonetheless, felt sufficiently threatened by the anti-imperial thrust of the Lend Lease Act and the Atlantic Charter, to develop propaganda to persuade the American public and its President that granting Indian selfgovernment in 1942 was inappropriate. The case for a propaganda campaign was made stronger by Roosevelt's constant pressure on Britaln from mid-1941 to reach a political settlement with India. Pressure was also brought to bear by the Congress Party as the price for its war-related cooperation, by China, and by the Labour Party in Britain. Japan's success in Singapore and Burma made strategists briefly assess that India might be the next target. Stable and cooperative government there was as much in America's interest as Britain's. The idea that Roosevelt might intervene in India to secure a measure of self-government there constantly worried Churchill. In turn this motivated the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information, the India Office, the Government of India and the British Embassy in Washington to develop propaganda based, firstly, on the official explanation for the failure of the Cripps Mission and, secondly. on the elements of the August 1942 Quit India resolution which could be presented as damaging to allied war aims. The perceived danger to Britain's India-related agenda, however, did not end with substantive threats. The volatility of the American press and the President's susceptibility to it in framing policy were more unpredictable. Britain met both threats by targetting friends with access to Roosevelt, sympathetic broadcasters and pro-British sections of the press. Each had shown support for Britain during the Lend Lease debates. Britain, however, could never assume that it had won the propaganda battle or that Roosevelt would not intervene polltically on nationalist India's behalf. Roosevelt continued during 1942 and beyond to let Indian leaders know of his interest in their struggle, and information received from his Mission in New Delhi and from unofficial informants in India gave him a view of events there which differed markedly from the British account. Just as nationalist India was unsure about America's intentions, so was Britain. |
