| Autor: |
Prates, Marcelo |
| Rok vydání: |
2021 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 21, 1, 410-432 |
| Druh dokumentu: |
Zeitschriftenartikel<br />journal article |
| ISSN: |
2178-1036 |
| DOI: |
10.31977/grirfi.v21i1.2191 |
| Popis: |
This article aims to analyze in Sartre's philosophy the notion of personalization. Inserted in the framework of existential psychoanalysis, this notion elucidates about the original choice and the existential project. Since his first works, Sartre has presented an impersonal transcendental conscience, so that freedom as nadification is independent of psychic life. We want to demonstrate that from the development of existential psychoanalysis freedom is not separated from the notion of personalization, but presupposes it due to the finitude condition of freedom. In this case, although it presupposes an impersonal transcendental field, freedom can only be apprehended concretely through personalization. This presupposes a necessary relationship between ontology and existential psychoanalysis in the elucidation of freedom, history, and the man. |
| Databáze: |
SSOAR – Social Science Open Access Repository |
| Externí odkaz: |
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