Veto players in post-conflict DDR programs: evidence from Nepal and the DRC
| Autor: | Ansorg, Nadine, Strasheim, Julia |
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| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Politikwissenschaft
Political science Veto-Spieler Veto-Spieler Theorie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Sicherheitspolitik Peace and Conflict Research International Conflicts Security Policy Konflikt Abrüstung Demobilisierung Spieltheorie Nepal Demokratische Republik Kongo conflict disarmament demobilization game theory Democratic Republic of the Congo 10500 |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13, 1, 112-130 |
| Druh dokumentu: | Zeitschriftenartikel<br />journal article |
| ISSN: | 1750-2985 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981 |
| Popis: | Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR. |
| Databáze: | SSOAR – Social Science Open Access Repository |
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