| Autor: |
Veldhuizen, Roel van |
| Přispěvatelé: |
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH |
| Rok vydání: |
2013 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
SP II 2013-210, Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, 41 |
| Druh dokumentu: |
Arbeitspapier<br />working paper |
| Popis: |
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract) |
| Databáze: |
SSOAR – Social Science Open Access Repository |
| Externí odkaz: |
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