| Popis: |
The book presents an analysis of one of the largest protests of the era of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia, the June revolt against the monetary reform in 1953 in Plzeň. The methodology employed in this book is based on the so‑called “new social movements” theories. The well‑known incident that took place in Plzeň has thus been put into the context of previous protests that took place in the Pilsen region in the period 1948–1953. This approach allows the author to map the various protest groups gradually developing throughout different segments of the society in western Bohemia that have – each in its own peculiar way – inspired the origination and the course of the Plzeň revolt of 1953. In this way, the book offers not only a more clear‑cut critical narrative of the June protests, but also an analysis of their cultural pedigree. Although the Plzeň revolt was a spontaneous reaction of the population to the launching of the so‑called monetary reform, its course also clearly mirrored the long‑standing social conflicts that had gradually accumulated in the region during the postwar period. As a result, it developed into an extremely dynamic and polymorphic protest with the capacity of repeatedly changing its form and the structure of its participants in the course of a single day. With some exaggeration, it is possible to assert that there were actually three parallel revolts taking place in Plzeň. Although these were mutually interrelated, their character was completely incommensurable. Different segments of society responded to the monetary reform in different ways – the differences stemming from a different protest culture. Their actions were motivated by different social conflicts, followed different cultural patterns, took on various forms of resistance and offered different solutions. 1) The first of the key conflicts erupted inside the Communist Party itself. It was caused not only by the social impact of the monetary reform, but also by the arrogance of its announcing and a lack of consideration for the privileges of party members. The majority of the membership base and the lower functionaries adopted an attitude of passive resistance towards the reform, thus de facto preventing its proper execution. At the same time, however, they remained in a position of loyalty to the system. This “passively‑loyal” resistance resulted in a collapse of the basic functions of the local party and partly also the security apparatus even before the actual commencement of the exchange of currency. The authority of the state government temporarily collapsed. This gave rise to a power vacuum that cleared the way for the activities of other segments of society. A specific form of party protest was discussion and inaction. Ideological inspiration for the communists was readily available from their previous experience with the political trials involving top‑tier party leaders. In the course of these trials, rank‑and‑file party members were systematically encouraged and even incited to express criticism and distrust of superordinate authorities. In the context of the Pilsen region, this kind of resistance followed on the heels of a stormy debate on intraparty democracy and the fight against local “dictators”, which had been taking place intermittently at least since May 1948, when the west‑Bohemian party apparatus went through a crisis caused by pro‑American demonstrations. At the root of this phenomenon was mainly the rapid and rather massive flow of new members into the Communist Party after World War II. The party was joined by great numbers of new members who were not mentally prepared for the post‑February enforcement of the principles of so‑called “democratic centralism”. The early postwar self‑presentation of the Communist Party was in fact quite different from the situation in the party in the 1950s. 2) The second strand of the revolt was carried by the industrial workers. The workers represented a well‑established and privileged social grou |
