Strongest Knowledge by Presence; Mulla Shamsa’s view about God’s Knowledge to others

Autor: Seyed Mohammad Ali Dibaji, Hassan Mohseni Rad
Jazyk: perština
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Zdroj: Comparative Theology, Vol 9, Iss 20, Pp 29-40 (2018)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 2008-9651
2322-3421
DOI: 10.22108/coth.2018.109238.1131
Popis: Abstract The essence of transcendent God’s knowledge, state of his knowledge before creation and the way of his knowledge to temporal variables are three important issues of his knowledge. These three are discussed both in philosophy and Kalam. In this article, based on a newly published work of Mulla Shamsa - named Khafri’s Review on Sharh Elahiyat Tajrid of Ghoshji about Divine Knowledge and Power- and some of his other works, we have been trying to present Shamsa’s answer. As will be described in this paper, he believes in knowledge of entity to entity for God, and calls it intense detailed knowledge by presence as unnamed meaning. He has presented some objections to Ibn-Sina’s view and believes that those are misunderstandings of Sheikh al-Raeis’s view. He thinks with his theory we can get an interpretation of Ibn-Sina’s view that Sohrevardi’s and Khaje-Nasir’s objections are answered. Although Mulla Shamsa, influenced by Hekmat Eshragh, accept the division of knowledge to by presence and acquired and in precise look only accepts knowledge by presence and believes that the acquired one backs to by presence, but does not admit some definitions of knowledge like attribution of knower to cognitions and by this, shows his independent way from Shiraz school. In Hashiiyeh, he reasons that since presence of objects for God is stronger than theirs for themselves, so the God’s knowledge to his nature is his knowledge to others and he believes that knowledge by presence comes true either by presence of cognition itself or presence of something more intense than presence of knowing itself, and knowledge of God is from second kind. This theosopher philosopher in Masalek Al-Yaghin introduces God’s knowledge a third kind of knowledge to show that calling God’s knowledge by presence or strongest knowledge by presence is not all of his theory but it has another aspect that is being detailed before creation. The philosopher of Gilan thinks both kinds of knowledge cause need to others for God and from this point of view he differs from Illuminationist philosophers and Theologians, giving a special interpretation from Ibn-Sina. Mulla Shamsa believes that the detailed knowledge of entity to entity for God is comprehensive and includes all aspects of his knowledge and explains it with two rules; first, knowledge itself is an absolute perfection for being as a being. Second, denying detailed knowledge in entity is the same as denying perfection from entity of God. The result of these two rules is proving detailed knowledge for God. He denies the attribute of non-detailed knowledge from God’s entity as argued by Peripatetic who told detailed knowledge is not perfection for entity in grade of entity. The exegete author believes God’s knowledge to effects is active one and knowledge of entity to entity is detailed knowledge that is united with entity. The God’s knowledge to creatures is not the creatures themselves (as Sohrevardi thought) but it is just God’s knowledge to his entity. Then, Mulla Shamsa’s intention from detailed knowledge is not like the famous meaning but it is derived from Ibn-Sina’s opinion. The detail and brevity, which are in common use of philosophers, in Mulla Shamsa’s view are attributes of everything other than God (cognitions). Then, basis of knowledge would be the entity of transcendent God and so he does not admit existence of grades in God’s knowledge and refer them back to cognitions which are not basis of his knowledge. Mulla Shamsa clarifies the knowledge of before creation with his special theory on God’s knowledge to others. According to this theory, knowledge to everything other than God is the same as knowledge of entity to entity. In this way, the problem of knowledge to non-existence would be solved, although he has not made any mention to this problem and its solution based on his theory. About God’s knowledge to variables, Hakim Mulla Shamsa mentions the putting down of suspended forms and acquired knowledge to Ibn-Sina by Sohrevardi in Mashare and Motarehat which was spread between late philosophers. This divine philosopher thinks because of denying acquired knowledge by Ibn-Sina in Shefa, the objections of Khaje Nasir don’t need any answer. He also believes excommunication of Ibn-Sina by Ghazali and others is because of their misunderstanding from Shekho Al-Raeis idea about Knowledge to details since they thought his intention about universal science means ignorance to temporal details which was not his purpose. Therefore, we can conclude that Mulla Shamsa’s idea about God’s knowledge is a kind of extending the theory of Ibn- Sina’s, especially about universal knowledge to temporal details.
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