Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
Autor: | Patricia Marechal |
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Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />French<br />Portuguese |
Rok vydání: | 2017 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 21, Iss 1, Pp 141-153 (2017) |
Druh dokumentu: | article |
ISSN: | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
DOI: | 10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141 |
Popis: | It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing. |
Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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