Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
| Autor: | T. S. Demin, K. G. Frolov |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Russian |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность", Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 102-109 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |
| DOI: | 10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-102-109 |
| Popis: | The article is devoted to the discussion about the relationship between knowledge and skill. This discussion arose within the critique of dualism. It is believed that dualism presupposes an intellectualism in which knowledge-how always derived from knowledge-that. The article proposes a method of distinguishing knowledgehow and knowledge-that through characteristic properties. This method allows us to draw a strict boundary between the two types of knowledge. This is followed by an explanation of the relationship between the two types of knowledge through the inclusion of knowledge-how as a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge-that. In the final part of the article, the principle of indistinguishability of knowledge-how among different agents is introduced, on the basis of which it is argued that the division into knowledge-how and knowledge-that works in the interests of dualism, and not vice versa, as supposed by Gilbert Ryle. This division makes sense in light of the Chinese room argument and the demonstration of the difference between humans and weak artificial intelligence. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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