Believing that P requires taking it to be the case that P: a reply to Grzankowski and Sankey

Autor:	James Simpson
Jazyk:	English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />French<br />Portuguese
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	belief alex grzankowski taking p to be the case Philosophy. Psychology. Religion Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Zdroj:	Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 24, Iss 1, Pp 233-237 (2020)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	1414-4247 1808-1711
DOI:	10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p233
Popis:	In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski argues, contra Howard Sankey, that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true. In this short reply, I’ll agree with Grzankowski that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true, and I’ll argue that Sankey’s recent response to Grzankowski is inadequate as it stands. However, it’ll be my contention that Grzankowski’s argument doesn’t demonstrate that believing that p doesn’t require taking it to be the case that p.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/fad983ba09314684aa17010c70e2ecf7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ