Believing that P requires taking it to be the case that P: a reply to Grzankowski and Sankey
Autor: | James Simpson |
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Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />French<br />Portuguese |
Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 24, Iss 1, Pp 233-237 (2020) |
Druh dokumentu: | article |
ISSN: | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
DOI: | 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p233 |
Popis: | In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski argues, contra Howard Sankey, that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true. In this short reply, I’ll agree with Grzankowski that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true, and I’ll argue that Sankey’s recent response to Grzankowski is inadequate as it stands. However, it’ll be my contention that Grzankowski’s argument doesn’t demonstrate that believing that p doesn’t require taking it to be the case that p. |
Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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