FIDUCIARY GAME RULES AND THE GOVERNANCE NATURE IN THE COMPANY

Autor: S. I. Lutsenko
Jazyk: ruština
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: Стратегические решения и риск-менеджмент, Vol 10, Iss 2, Pp 144-155 (2019)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 2618-947X
2618-9984
DOI: 10.17747/2618-947X-2019-2-144-155
Popis: The author considers features of relationships between the fiduciary (management, board of director) and shareholders (beneficiaries). The nature of fiduciary relations is connected with «a critical resource» (assets) of the beneficiary. In the company economic interests of various participants (shareholders, management) face. Delegation discretion the shareholder to the management will allow to build together with the shareholder effective economic strategy of the company, under condition of execution of fiduciary duties. The management possesses administrative immunity within the limits of application of the business judgment rule. Actions of the management at transaction fulfilment should have real character, possess economic sense, a rationality and to promote achievement of economic benefit in the form of increase to shareholder value. The special attention is given to the fiduciary nature of interaction. Imposing of fiduciary duties on the management allows the beneficiary to protect the company from destruction of shareholder value. The shareholder should specify such game rules that the management was unable break them or, at least, cost of their infringement would be above reception of personal benefit. Fiduciary principles allow to soften the conflict between management and the shareholder. Besides, the fiduciary mechanism possesses a preventive element, keeping the company from destruction. The given obligation of loyalty protects resources of the shareholder from wrongful acts from the management. Fiduciary principles allow to balance economic interests between a management and shareholders.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals
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