Freiheit des Willens in der frühen Kant-Rezeption
| Autor: | Manfred Baum |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | German<br />English<br />Russian |
| Rok vydání: | 2024 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Кантовский сборник, Vol 43, Iss 1, Pp 17-46 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0207-6918 2310-3701 |
| DOI: | 10.5922/0207-6918-2024-1-2 |
| Popis: | Kant’s solution for the problem of freedom of the will rests on his transcendental idealism and its differentiation of appearances and things in themselves. Human beings, with their bodies and observable inner and outer activities, are objects of perception (empirical intuition) and therefore appearances. These are only the appearances of their noumenal selves. Human beings are determined by laws of nature in all their perceivable alterations which include all their actions, but their noumenal selves, not being in time, are not determined by the necessity of causal laws of nature, but can be determined by the moral law of their pure practical reason which they give to themselves. The actions of the will, observable volitions and external actions, can therefore, at the same time, be under the necessitating law of nature, i.e. be unfree, and, as appearances of the self-determination of their noumenal will (by fulfilling the demands of the moral law), be free. Two professors of Jena University, Ulrich and Schmid, accept part of Kant’s transcendental idealism but contend that the many transgressions of the moral law in human acting must have their noumenal reason in the agent’s intelligible character or in the intelligible substrate of nature. This theory is called “intelligible fatalism”. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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