The importance of invisible rulers in democracy. A study of the 'latent power structure' of two Executives in Spain (2004 and 2012)
| Autor: | Andrés Villena-Oliver, Bernabé Aldeguer-Cerdá |
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| Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Revista Española de Ciencia Política, Vol 0, Iss 45, Pp 67-94 (2017) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1575-6548 2173-9870 |
| DOI: | 10.21308/recp.45.03 |
| Popis: | This article aims to analyze the composition of two recent Spanish governments from the point of view of the relations between their members before the executives were formed. This perspective lets us know how certain individual actors and power groups are potentially able to influence the government formation process and its political action. In order to carry out this study, the concept of the ‘Latent Power Structure’ is defined as a set of former presidents, ex ministers and enterprise directors or managers that have established relevant social ties with the members of a government due to having coincided in certain institutions in the past. Taking the Latent Power Structure into account allows us to conceive governments as public agencies that accumulate a higher degree of social relations than it can be inferred out of their formal structure. In this sense, the Latent Power Structure shows, on the one hand, that the executives have relevant social ties with power groups –especially big private firms–; and, on the other hand, these governments are, in fact, networks of members endowed with a greater internal cohesion than it is clearly identifiable from the high ranking officials formally recruited. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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