| Autor: |
Brian Scott Ballard |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Philosophies, Vol 9, Iss 2, p 38 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2409-9287 |
| DOI: |
10.3390/philosophies9020038 |
| Popis: |
This essay raises a challenge for the perceptual theory of emotion. According to the perceptual theory, emotions are perceptual states that represent values. But if emotions represent values, something should explain why. In virtue of what do emotions represent the values they do? A psychosemantics would answer this, and that’s what the perceptual theorist owes us. To date, however, the only perceptual theorist to attempt a psychosemantics for emotion is Jesse Prinz. And Prinz’s theory, I argue, faces an important difficulty: It makes the pairing of any given emotion with its respective value entirely arbitrary. But that’s a problem. It seems—and this is a major contention of this essay—that an emotion, in virtue of how it feels, bears a natural or non-arbitrary link to the value it represents. And this datum makes it all the more difficult to provide a viable psychosemantics for the evaluative content of emotion. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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