Concepts May Still Be Objects
| Autor: | Harold Noonan |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | Czech<br />English<br />Slovak |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Organon F, Vol 29, Iss 3, Pp 376-388 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1335-0668 2585-7150 |
| DOI: | 10.31577/orgf.2022.29304 |
| Popis: | In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says, it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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