An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints

Autor:	Zaifu Yang, Jingsheng Yu
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2024
Předmět:	dynamic menu auction core budget constraints Political institutions and public administration (General) JF20-2112 Economic theory. Demography HB1-3840
Zdroj:	Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 105-130 (2024)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	2399-844X 2399-8458
DOI:	10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006
Popis:	An auctioneer wishes to sell multiple heterogeneous indivisible items to several bidders. Every bidder can demand several items, have complex preferences and faces a hard budget constraint. In this setting, Walrasian equilibria may fail to exist. We propose an ascending menu auction that always yields an efficient allocation of items, which is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. Furthermore, the auction finds a strong core allocation with a fully efficient assignment of items when bidders are not budget constrained.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/f1f80665b05646c7a0929c9854a16940 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ