The 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division in the Defensive Battles for Don River Crossings and Its Role in the Rescue of Some Sothern Front Units in the Summer of 1942
| Autor: | Sergey A. Zayarny, Utash B. Ochirov |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Mongolian<br />Russian |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Oriental Studies, Vol 10, Iss 6, Pp 43-61 (2018) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2619-0990 2619-1008 2075-7794 |
| DOI: | 10.22162/2075-7794-2017-34-6-43-61 |
| Popis: | The article deals with the history of combat operations for the defense of Don River crossings in the Manych and Sala River valleys conducted by the 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division (in the stanitsas of Bagaevskaya, Melikhovskaya and Razdorskaya) in July of 1942. After the heavy defeats of the late 1941 - early 1942 the German military command realized the impossibility of conducting strategic operations on all fronts, and chose the South direction as the main one within the new campaign aiming to secure the Caucasian oil fields and, thus, win the war not by direct attacks but as a result of economic oppression. The Wehrmacht planned to encircle and eliminate troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts within a chain of operations on the right bank of the Don - so as to clear the way towards their goal. So, Army Group South accumulated large forces equipped with latest military machinery and weapons. During the Donbass defensive operation of 1942 the Soviet troops attempted to counter the attacks of fascist forces but were defeated. And those were Don River crossings - including the mentioned ones - that proved critical to the rescue of Southern Front units. The rivers crossings next to the stanitsas of Bagaevskaya, Melikhovskaya and Razdorskaya were defended by the 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division. The national military unit had been formed shortly before in Kalmykia, had no combat experience, and became fully armed (except for air defense guns) only on the eve of the battles. Nonetheless, the 110th Cavalry Division was perfectly manned (including with those from the discontinued 111th Kalmyk Cavalry Division), its soldiers had passed full training courses, were acquainted with and trusted their commanding officers. The Soviet top military were well aware that a cavalary division was not designed for such defense activities, especially on the 58 km long front, but no infantry units that could replace the Kalmyk cavalry were found. Recognizing the importance of those river crossings, the Germans had constantly bombed the area, and then forwarded there the most elite division of the Wehrmacht - the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. Still, due to efficient actions, valour and tremendous efforts of soldiers and officers who worked and defended the crossings, they managed to rescue and transport to the southern bank over 425 thousand people, 215 tanks, approximately 1 300 artillery pieces, over 8 thousand tractors and trucks (including multiple rocket launchers), 10 thousand carts, 22 thousand horces, etc. It was through those river crossings that the bulk of the 37th, 24th and 9th Armies as well as diverse remnants of some other armies of the former Southwestern Front - that had played a significant role in the Battle of the Caucasus at the initial stage - were evacuated. As a result, the German top military's plans of encircling the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts were disrupted, which proved crucial to the general failure in achieving the main goal of the 1942 campaign. And the 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division largely contributed to this failure of the Wehrmacht. |
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