Agency Costs and Ownership Structure in Oil Industry

Autor:	Rafael Pessoa Delgado, Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo
Jazyk:	English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	custos de agência governança governo estrutura de propriedade petróleo Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Accounting. Bookkeeping HF5601-5689
Zdroj:	RAC: Revista de Administração Contemporânea, Vol 23, Iss 4, Pp 476-498 (2019)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	1415-6555 1982-7849
DOI:	10.1590/1982-7849rac2019180068
Popis:	This work focuses on analyzing the influence of government ownership of oil companies listed on US stock exchanges on its agency costs, taking into account characteristics of such companies that may interfere on this relationship. Results indicate that companies on which governments hold a stake tend to present higher agency costs than its private peers when we consider asset utilization efficiency. Measuring it by a discretionary expenses index, the coefficients suggest the same conclusion, although they are not statistically significant. In addition, companies’ size and leverage were found to be relevant factors.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/ab904bdc5d594af9a0f8fddc482365d1 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ