A New Design for Alignment-Free Chaffed Cancelable Iris Key Binding Scheme
Autor: | Tong-Yuen Chai, Bok-Min Goi, Yong-Haur Tay, Zhe Jin |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Symmetry, Vol 11, Iss 2, p 164 (2019) |
Druh dokumentu: | article |
ISSN: | 2073-8994 11020164 |
DOI: | 10.3390/sym11020164 |
Popis: | Iris has been found to be unique and consistent over time despite its random nature. Unprotected biometric (iris) template raises concerns in security and privacy, as numerous large-scale iris recognition projects have been deployed worldwide—for instance, susceptibility to attacks, cumbersome renewability, and cross-matching. Template protection schemes from biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics are expected to restore the confidence in biometrics regarding data privacy, given the great advancement in recent years. However, a majority of the biometric template protection schemes have uncertainties in guaranteeing criteria such as unlinkability, irreversibility, and revocability, while maintaining significant performance. Fuzzy commitment, a theoretically secure biometric key binding scheme, is vulnerable due to the inherent dependency of the biometric features and its reliance on error correction code (ECC). In this paper, an alignment-free and cancelable iris key binding scheme without ECC is proposed. The proposed system protects the binary biometric data, i.e., IrisCodes, from security and privacy attacks through a strong and size varying non-invertible cancelable transform. The proposed scheme provides flexibility in system storage and authentication speed via controllable hashed code length. We also proposed a fast key regeneration without either re-enrollment or constant storage of seeds. The experimental results and security analysis show the validity of the proposed scheme. |
Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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