| Autor: |
Hideyuki Morofuji, Setsuya Kurahashi |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2023 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics, Vol 9 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2297-4687 |
| DOI: |
10.3389/fams.2023.1045108 |
| Popis: |
This study aims to analyze the structure of the emergence and maintenance of the cartel mechanism as an informal organization and the measures to deter bid-rigging. We propose an agent-based bid-rigging norms model and validate it with a mathematical model. We clarify that the auction system primarily used in public procurements has a structure inducing bid-rigging in which meta-norms are unnecessary. We also show that punishment for deviation from bid-rigging plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining it. In addition, we explore the authorities' actions to deter bid-rigging by examining three measures: the flexible setting of reserve prices, the administrative surcharge and leniency system under the Antimonopoly Law, and applying the bid-rigging offense under the Criminal Law. As a result, the study reveals that the administrative surcharge and the leniency system are insufficient to deter bid-rigging, and the adequate measures are the flexible setting of reserve prices and applying the bid-rigging offense. Furthermore, the simultaneous implementation of these three measures more effectively enables deterring bid-rigging. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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