Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis
| Autor: | Rafael Miranda-Rojas |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | Spanish; Castilian |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol 46, Iss 105 (2020) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0120-131X 2389-9980 |
| Popis: | In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as a hidden premise), conducting this way to a skeptical conclusion without questioning the plausibility of FWS in the first place. I argue that this kind of conflict between two skeptical scenarios removes the validity of ST and FWS: It is ad hoc to assume a skeptical scenario S1 (ST) that supports thesis T1, and implicitly rejects the consequences of another skeptical scenario S2 (FWS) that discards T1. This implies the rejection of the so-called Moral Paralysis (MP) and shows a tension between Moral Skepticism (MS), ST and FWS. Moreover, the links between skepticism, dogmatism and atheism, as a case of epistemic defeasibility, are discussed. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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