CORRUPTION AS AN INSTITUTE OF COMMUNICATION IN THE ‘PRINCIPAL – AGENT’ MODEL

Autor:	N. К. Dyatlova, Ya. A. Tsader
Jazyk:	English<br />Russian
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	corruption institution institutional economics ‘principal-agent’ model contract communication agency relations History of Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics DK1-4735 Psychology BF1-990
Zdroj:	Вестник Кемеровского государственного университета, Vol 0, Iss 2-5, Pp 209-213 (2015)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	2078-8975 2078-8983
Popis:	In terms of the ‘principal-agent model’ corruption can be defined as violation of the contract (formal or informal) between the agent and the principal. The resources provided by the principal are then used by the agent for their private needs. From this perspective constitutional rights can be viewed as a universal contraction policy. The paper studies the process of corruption institutionalization as a form of opportunistic behavior in agency relations. The conclusions are based on the experimental data of a recent survey conducted among the students studying the course on “Corruption: causes, consequences, counteraction”. According to the author’s position, corruption plays a role of a communication tool, fulfilling the existing institutional failures.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/95c15e48d9364f2caf48e867bb82c2fd Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ