An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism

Autor:	Byeong D. Lee
Jazyk:	Czech<br />English<br />Slovak
Rok vydání:	2024
Předmět:	epistemic rationality practical rationality evidentialism the right kind of reasons the wrong kind of reasons Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Zdroj:	Organon F, Vol 31, Iss 2, Pp 95-113 (2024)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	1335-0668 2585-7150
DOI:	10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
Popis:	There are cases in which epistemic rationality seems to conflict with practical rationality. Evidentialists such as Parfit, Shah, Skorupski and Way deny that there are practical reasons for belief. On their view, the only genuine normative reasons for belief are epistemic reasons, and so the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. But I argue in this paper that the evidentialists can still face a genuine dilemma between epistemic and practical rationality which cannot be resolved on the grounds that the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/955caddac55a4dda8f5e4a17333f3bdf Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ