Omniscience and the Problem of Indexicals
| Autor: | Mohammad Ali Mirbagheri, Abbas Yazdani |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Persian |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, Vol 24, Iss 2, Pp 33-52 (2022) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1735-9791 2538-2500 |
| DOI: | 10.22091/jptr.2022.7870.2678 |
| Popis: | One of the traditional theistic beliefs is the belief in God’s absolute attributes. One of these absolute attributes is “Omniscience”. But there are some challenges concerning this attribute and one of them addresses indexical propositions. Among all kinds of indexicals de presenti -propositions that inform about present time, the de se propositions are considered by philosophers. Philosophers who criticize Omniscience use these propositions in different ways. In this article, these challenges and responses to them will be scrutinized.De presenti propositions are troublesome for traditional theism because it seems that the knowledge of different present moments causes a change in God and this contradicts God’s immutability. For example, if God knows that “it is 9 a.m. now”, then He should know “it is 10 a.m. now” an hour later. So, His knowledge changes from time to time which means God Himself changes.There are some responses to this problem:1- To change de presenti propositions to non-indexical ones. For example, the audiences of The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy of Iran could say: “Today, the Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy was declared” or say: “The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy is declared on August 5, 1906”. Therefore, the knowledge of such propositions is fixed through time.2- To claim that God is timeless. That is, God is outside the boundaries of time and His knowledge of different moments, unlike human beings, is immutable.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. Theologians traditionally have presupposed that any kind of change in an absolutely perfect being brings it down from its absolute perfection. But this is not so clear. It can be shown that some changes in God, including changes in His knowledge of different moments, do not affect His perfection.Also, knowledge of de se propositions like “I’m in the hospital”, is challenging for God being Omniscient because only the person who utters such propositions, not God, can know them.There are some responses to this problem:1- To distinguish between the content of a proposition and the proposition itself. Although “I’m in the hospital” can only be explained by the patient himself, it indicates a situation in the world, that is, that person X is in the hospital, which can also be explained by other people. Although God's knowledge does not belong to the de se propositions themselves, it belongs to the content of such propositions,2- Theists can claim that knowledge does not belong to propositions themselves, but belongs to their truth. In such a case, the Omniscient can know “I’m in the hospital” is true.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. According to this solution, theists can consider what atheists put forward against Omniscience not as a denial of the existence of God, but as an illumination of the concept of God, and by accepting it, restrict the extension of the absolute knowledge of God.In this article, we first try to show that some of the objections against solutions for the problem of indexicals could be avoided. So, responses like God’s timelessness or distinction between a proposition and its content can overcome the problem. At the same time, the final solution in each part, which is to modify the interpretation of the concept of God, is a way for those who think other responses do not work. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|