| Autor: |
Zack Garrett |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Philosophies, Vol 9, Iss 4, p 104 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2409-9287 |
| DOI: |
10.3390/philosophies9040104 |
| Popis: |
Much of the debate about the mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes surrounds the logical possibility of completing supertasks—tasks made up of an infinite number of subtasks. Max Black and J.F. Thomson attempt to show that supertasks entail logical contradictions, but their arguments come up short. In this paper, I take a different approach to the mathematical refutations. I argue that even if supertasks are possible, we do not have a non-question-begging reason to think that Achilles’ supertask is possible. The justification for the possibility of Achilles’ supertask lies in the possibility of him completing other supertasks of the same kind, and the justification for the possibility of him completing these other supertasks lies in the possibility of him completing yet more supertasks ad infinitum. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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