| Autor: |
Stefan Majetschak |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2021 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, Vol 9, Iss 4 (2021) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2159-0303 |
| DOI: |
10.15173/jhap.v9i4.4683 |
| Popis: |
After 1945, when the Philosophical Investigations were largely finished, Wittgenstein spent his final years undertaking an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them. In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In Section 2 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In Section 3 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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