When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information
| Autor: | Joanna Franaszek |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Polish |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Vol 307, Iss 3, Pp 5-23 (2021) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0867-0005 2300-5238 |
| DOI: | 10.33119/GN/139049 |
| Popis: | Even when information is complex and the information processing capacity of economic agents uncertain, noisy messages do not necessarily indicate bad news. I exploit this intuition to examine a simple sender – receiver persuasion game in which effective communication about the state of the world depends not only on the sender’s efforts but also on the complexity of that state and the receiver’s competence. In this environment, the sender-optimal equilibria maximise the amount of noise. The receiver faces a ”competence curse” whereby the smart types might end up with less information and a lower payoff than those who are somewhat less competent. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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